NATO AT 75: WHAT’S NEXT FOR THE ALLIANCE?

There are many people who are fascinated by NATO, either because they think it has lasted too long or because they don’t quite understand why it still exists!  I’d subscribe to neither proposition.  The Alliance has become more important in the current international context and is likely to acquire greater prominence after President Trump’s election. This look-ahead is set in the context of broader geostrategic change and goes on to consider some specific challenges for NATO itself, the US, Europe and the UK.

The broad picture first.  We are self-evidently in a time of political and security turmoil.  Leadership capacity globally, but in particular in the West, seems inadequate to meet the growing number of challenges.  Whether President Trump will add to that capacity or detract from it remains to be seen.  Non-state actors are playing an increasing role and international institutions are weakening.  

Malign actors, such as Russia, North Korea and Iran are banding together.  With China, we’re seeing the emergence of the CRINK’s, a group determined to take advantage of a perceived decline in US power and that of the West as a whole. Chinese assertiveness is becoming increasingly obvious and seems likely to collide with that of the new US Administration.  All at the same time as President Trump attempts a more transactional relationship with Russia.

Overall, threats to security are growing in a way that is causing many governments to re-assess their strategic priorities.    Australia and Japan are changing their defence posture.  The US is pivoting towards the Pacific – a policy that seems likely to reinforced under Trump – and with Marco Rubio as Secretary of State may also focus increasingly on Latin America.  In NATO the implications of the mutual defence arrangement between Russia and North Korea are causing increasing concern with a current focus on the Russian campaign in Ukraine.

At the same time, domestic/electoral issues in many Western countries are pulling effort, resources and attention away from fundamental geopolitical concerns.   Migration is a particular problem that governments of both North and South have failed to get to grips with.

Now to specifics.  Outside NATO territory but in its Mediterranean ‘back yard’, Israel’s wars in Gaza and the Lebanon (and its ‘hot stand-off’ with Iran) have resulted in a major humanitarian crisis (which seems likely to get worse); illustrated the limitations of Western influence on Prime Minister Netanyahu; severely damaged Israel’s legal and moral reputation; and devalued the UN’s institutional role.  The arrest warrants issued by the ICC are a rational and sensible response to the appalling events linked to both sides.  In Europe, I can only see continuing decline in popular and political support for Israel - notwithstanding acknowledgement of its right to defend itself - until it begins to act more humanely and proportionately.  Of course, the Trump Administration may well not see things the same way.  

Rather closer to home, the war in Ukraine continues to have major impact with very significant geopolitical implications, both for the world and for NATO.  For many in Europe it’s an existential issue, but for Trump it seems more a quagmire that’s wasting US resources. Both sides are now jockeying for position in advance of the US Presidential inauguration on 20 January; Putin remains a rational actor, and his heavy breathing about nuclear weapons needs to be seen in that context.  His threats to use hypersonic missiles may be of more immediate operational concern.

Despite recent setbacks, Ukraine is fighting a clever war, and in the process teaching Western militaries a thing or two.  NATO has given itself a major co-ordinating role in marshalling support for Ukraine but it is hard to see how Europe could carry the burden without the US; money aside, Europeans simply do not have some of the capabilities needed.  President Biden’s agreement to allow the Ukrainians to use long-range US missiles against targets in Russia is welcome and long overdue.  But it will not of itself solve the conflict and the diplomacy around it has not been adroitly handled.

If and when there is to be a peace deal, it is far from certain on what basis Ukraine would be prepared to settle. Personally, I worry about the moral basis on which any European country could put pressure on it to do so in the face of such blatant aggression by Russia.   But in the Trump universe some sort of territorial concession seems inevitable. So a key issue will be the guarantees of a settlement (as opposed to the settlement itself).  Both the UK/Europe and NATO need to ensure Russian aggression is not disproportionately rewarded or that the scene is set for a further round of Russian aggrandisement (perhaps this time into NATO territory).  I suspect the Trump Administration recognises that too; further war in Europe would not be in the interests of an ‘America made Great Again’.

What does all this mean for NATO, charged with the defence of the (carefully undefined) Euro-Atlantic area?  It’s important to recognise that NATO is fundamentally a politico-military Alliance.  The NATO Treaty is very simple. Article 5, which agrees that an attack on one party shall be considered an attack against them all, imposes no binding obligation on anyone to do anything – although it does commit a party to assist the attacked Ally by taking such action as it (the party) deems necessary to restore and maintain security.  So there is a balance between a very solemn political commitment and leaving each Ally maximum discretion as to how it carries out that commitment.

That means that politics matter in the Alliance.  Building political cohesion in NATO is an absolute requirement for an effective military response.  It means the Alliance must be concerned with developments outside its home area, though its defence commitments do not extend outside it.  And it means that before it extends the Article 5 guarantee to any country that guarantee must be realistically deliverable.  For that and many other reasons European Allies have a fundamental interest in ensuring the US remains bound into the defence of Europe both politically and militarily. Neither will be particularly easy under Trump and both should be Number One on the European agenda.

It's obvious that in current circumstances resources are a fundamental problem for NATO.  The requirement for Europe to do (and spend) more will become even more important with the arrival of Trump.  Fundamentally it is reasonable for him to try to reduce the US share of the burden.  US military capacity and readiness have reduced as a result of Gaza & Ukraine and will take time to rebuild. There is also the pivot to the Pacific mentioned earlier.

Within NATO, some Allies, notably Poland and Norway (both of whom have up close and personal experience of Russia), have come good on the need to do more.  The Polish Army has roughly doubled in size in the last 10 years and aims to expand by another 100,000 including reservists.   New Allies have also helped - the wartime strength of the Finnish miliary is estimated at 280,000 with 23,000 active personnel, and Sweden will bring a further 24,000 active personnel and 31,800 reserves. But others, including well-established Allies, have been more coy, and the debate has now restarted on whether there should be a specific European pillar of defence. Whether that should be in or outside the Alliance – and NATO’s articulation with the EU - is likely to be debated at length over the next few years.  The Alliance’s discussions will be greatly assisted by the new Secretary General, Mark Rutte, who as a former Netherlands Prime Minister is very experienced and has a good relationship with President Trump, recently renewed at Mar-A-Lago.

The UK does not come out well, despite its support for Ukraine. The Labour government has not yet committed to really meaningful increases in defence expenditure, pending (yet another) defence review.  It has not yet renewed its predecessor’s commitment to spend 2.5% of GDP; the current figure is around 2.3% and may drop further.  The extra £3bn given to the MoD in last month’s budget is only enough to tide things over.  The Defence Secretary has acknowledged that currently we would probably be defeated in a war.  

Mass matters in defence and while 21st century capabilities are essential you can’t operate successfully without retaining significant traditional warfighting capacity. Recent UK economies in amphibious landing ships, helicopters and other (admittedly old) capabilities send the wrong signal.  Press reports that there will be no more significant money for defence are ominous, to say the least.   Such a position will not be good enough for President Trump and may affect the UK’s credibility with the new Administration on a broad range of issues, including tariffs and trade.

Prime Minister Starmer needs to make up his mind soon on growing the defence budget despite the other financial pressures he faces.  In current circumstances 3% of GDP (or perhaps even more) is much nearer the required level for defence expenditure.  But perhaps it’s time to stop talking in terms of GDP (which fluctuates) and instead benchmark Allies’ performance by their ability to provide effective forces and capabilities required by SACEUR.

A second fundamental problem for the Alliance is how to contain Russia, and then move beyond containment. The prospective appointment of Tulsi Gabbard as US DNI does not send a helpful signal, although Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz have more conventional views on Russia (‘Peace through Strength’).  Ukraine has helpfully focussed minds, and Allies are now re-learning old Cold War skills.  The recent NATO exercise in Latvia is a significant demonstration of deterrence.  But deterrence has to be seen in the context of the 2020’s, not the 1960’s, and containment needs to be seen as much in terms of cyber and drone warfare as main battle tanks.

A third (and much more wicked) problem is how to map out some sort of political European end-state post-Ukraine.  I touched on guarantees earlier.  With Trump in the room, it will no longer be possible to argue that regime change in Russia is an essential pre-requisite to a stable European Security architecture? So what is? Should NATO enlarge further and if so how far?  The Alliance will need to make its mind up quite quickly.  

Within NATO one effect of increasing defence capacity has been increased political willingness to delegate more power to the Military Structure.  That is necessary for effective planning and operational response, but sooner or later governments will need to reflect on how far they are prepared for this to go.  Certainly, Pete Hegseth seems likely to push through sweeping changes at the Pentagon.

There will also be changes in the political balance within the Alliance; capability in effect buys influence.  We can expect a consequent change in the balance of NATO appointments with some older Allies (like the UK) losing out to those who contribute more.  That can scarcely be welcome to a government anxious to protect the UK’s reputation as a major global player.

I’ll conclude with the reflection that the Alliance is now more vital than it has been for a long time.  We have President Putin to thank for that.