Nicholas Williams OBE is a Senior Associate Fellow for the European Leadership Network (ELN). He was a long-serving member of NATO’s International Staff, most recently as Head of Operations for Afghanistan and Iraq. Prior to this, Nick served in senior positions in NATO, EU, and British missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Iraq. He began his career in the British Ministry of Defence working on defence policy and planning issues, with multiple secondments to NATO functions during the Cold War and to the French Ministry of Defence in its aftermath.
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NATO does not have a Russia policy. Except for defending against Russia and supporting Ukraine to do the same, the wider strategic dimension is missing. Does NATO aim merely to contain and contest Russia militarily? Or, when conditions permit, will it attempt to have a broader approach, embodying dialogue, arms control and a lowering of tensions?
Over the past two years, there has been a contentious debate within NATO over future relations with Russia. It has focussed primarily on the status of the NATO-Russia Founding Act 1, the comprehensive agreement signed in 1997 at the high point of optimism about NATO’s future partnership and cooperation with Russia. That Act was signed by Boris Yeltsin and NATO leaders at a NATO Summit in Paris in 1997. In return for Russia’s acceptance of the forthcoming enlargement of NATO, NATO made what now appear to be significant military concessions to Russia. As a sign of their permanent commitment to a productive and constructive relationship, the Founding Act also established the NATO-Russia Council 2, which met, more or less regularly, from 1997 to 2021, as a forum for dialogue and cooperation.
NATO has been divided over Russia.
Since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, and even more so after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, many Eastern allies have argued that NATO should abandon the NATO-Russia Founding Act in its entirety, with its presumption of dialogue with Russia and its one-sided military constraints on NATO. The Act, they argue, implies a second-class status for the “new members”. They have thus been pushing for a wider policy debate on Russia to establish that there cannot be a return to the status quo ante.
The US, Germany and several Western European allies were strongly opposed to opening up a policy discussion on Russia during the current conflict. They argued that a wider Russia policy cannot be discussed, let alone determined, before the conflict in Ukraine is concluded. The US stance causes suspicion among many European allies. They fear that the US might be tempted to settle the Russia-Ukraine conflict over the heads of allies on terms which satisfy US electoral imperatives but may sacrifice the interests of Europe.
The differences over whether to have a wider policy debate, but not over the substance of a policy itself, have now been resolved. At NATO’s Washington Summit in July, NATO will initiate a wide-ranging discussion on what the relationship with Russia should look like beyond the present conflict. In short, containment and confrontation versus deterrence and dialogue (the classic NATO approach 3). The resultant policy is expected to be endorsed at NATO’s 2025 Summit in the Netherlands.
The devil is in the military detail.
What were the concessions to Russia in 1997 which many eastern allies still resent? The Founding Act is a mix of high blown political rhetoric, including a clear Russian acceptance of the right of all states in Europe to choose their own security path, and hard military compromises. In the Act, NATO assured Russia that it had:
• no intention …. to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.
• no need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy because of enlargement.
• no intention …. to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of future new members.
As significantly, NATO agreed that “in the current and foreseeable security environment … it would rely on reinforcement rather than the additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in the new member states.” Weasel wording perhaps, but, in effect, Russia, through the Act, received assurances that NATO enlargement would not result in an eastward basing of nuclear or substantial conventional forces. Russia accepted no similar or reciprocal limitations, except for vague commitments to restraint and a commitment to update the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.
Ambiguity of the Act’s Status
Surprisingly, despite the invasion of Ukraine, NATO has not formally renounced the Founding Act. Its current status is ambiguous. According to the NATO Secretary General, “Russia has walked away from the NATO-Russia Founding Act. They have violated it again and again.” 4 More authoritatively, NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept, agreed by all allies, declares that “we cannot consider the Russian Federation to be our partner”, but it did not specifically refer to the Founding Act by name. It seems therefore that NATO, without formal renunciation, regards the Act as non-constraining.
But there remain significant uncertainties. Will NATO abide by the nuclear constraints, as it has until now, despite the conflict in Ukraine? And is the NATO-Russia Council cancelled, or in abeyance? This latter question will be difficult to resolve. If the Council is merely in abeyance, it would be a sign of intent, at least, of NATO’s openness to dialogue should Russia alter its behaviour.
Many allies will therefore hesitate before cancelling the NATO-Russia Council. Since 1997, politically, NATO and Russia have maintained a functioning relationship, albeit far from the easy and close cooperation envisaged in the Act. Before Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, there was mutually productive cooperation on Afghanistan. However, since then, the relationship has been fitful and distant, with the NATO-Russia Council turning into a forum for NATO members to accuse Russia of violating the very Act that provided the basis for dialogue and cooperation between the two. The cancellation of the NATO-Russia Council would signify a definitive closing of the door to dialogue between NATO as an institution and Russia, thereby solidifying a cold war-like division.
NATO-Russia – the Future
At some stage, the conflict in Ukraine will end, probably without either side satisfied with the outcome. NATO collectively will then face a choice, whether to try to contain Russia or to try painstakingly to reconstruct a modus vivendi with it. Russia will also face a choice: whether to continue to build up its military capability at ruinous expense, or to try to limit the inevitable military competition to the lowest possible level of armaments by re-engaging in dialogue, arms control and confidence building measures.
It will take a long time even to restart dialogue between NATO and Russia, let alone make progress towards a renewal of arms control and restraint. The best that can be hoped for, eventually, is a modus vivendi, accompanied by a fitful and accusatory dialogue. The NATO promise to Ukraine on membership will be repeated at NATO’s July 2024 Washington Summit, albeit “when conditions are met”. This open-ended promise will reinforce the stand-off with Russia, irrespective of how the current conflict ends. Nevertheless, it is worth the effort to salvage some elements of the NATO-Russia relationship, including a conjectural and conditional preservation of the NATO-Russia Council, to avoid the alternative – perpetual competition and confrontation. NATO so far has abided by “the three nuclear noes” set out in the Founding Act. However long it takes, perhaps a mutual commitment to nuclear restraint in Europe would help set the ball rolling. Regrettably, Sisyphus comes to mind.
1 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed by Boris Yeltsin and NATO leaders at the NATO Summit in Paris, 27 May 199, usually termed “the Founding Act”.
2 Originally named the “Permanent Joint Council” (PJC) it underwent a superficial upgrade and named the “NATO-Russia Council” (NRC) in 2002.
3 The 1967 “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance”, also known as the Harmel Report, was a seminal document in NATO’s history. It reasserted NATO’s basic principles and effectively introduced the notion of deterrence and détente, setting the scene for NATO’s first steps toward a more cooperative approach with the USSR on security issues.
4 “Russia has walked away from the NATO-Russia Founding Act”, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ig_fciPKjUQ
